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1 Introduction18
There is a critical question regarding the energy transition: does accumulating renewable-based clean19
energy such as solar and wind necessarily lead to the stranding of fossil-based dirty energy such as coal,20
oil, and natural gas? The existing literature on the stranded asset shows that environmental regulations21
induce demand shifts towards renewables and fully replace the polluting fossil energy. As a result of22
the replacement effect, a substantial share of fossil-based dirty assets such as coal resource reserves and23
coal-fired power plants would be at risk of becoming stranded assets (e.g., Allen et al., 2009; McGlade24
and Ekins, 2015; van der Ploeg, 2018). As a departure from the existing view, this paper shows that25
clean capital investment as induced by stringent environmental regulations might not necessarily lead26
to the stranding of dirty capital, and the future energy landscape is compatible with the coexistence27
between fossil-based dirty and renewable-based clean energy.28
Figure 1: China’s installed capacity of power generation using fossil energy such as coal, oil, and natural
gas (dirty capital) and using renewable energy such as solar, wind, hydropower, and nuclear (clean
capital). Source: Statistics of China Electric Power Industry 2017 (China Electric Power Press, 2017b)
Our claims are supported by the stylized fact given in Figure 1. When China’s investments in clean29
energy assets kick-off and accelerate during 1970-2016, the installed capacity of generations based on fossil30
dirty energy augments at the same pace rather than falls precipitously in the face of renewable-based31
clean energy assets. Even when environmental regulations are tightened to curb pollution around 2005,32
the installed capacity of fossil energy capital is still in a rising trend, though the share of dirty capital33
shows a sign of decline. There is no clear evidence that fossil-based dirty capital would necessarily become34
stranded and fully replaced by renewables during the energy transition.35
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Given the above-mentioned stylized fact, we are motivated to explore a mechanism through which36
energy transition can accommodate the simultaneous accumulation of both dirty and clean capital. By37
doing this, we wish to find a way to avoid the potential stranding of dirty capital during the energy38
transition. The conventional pattern of the energy transition, by developing clean energy to replace dirty39
one, entails a process of creative destruction that destroys the economic values of fossil resources. Fossil40
fuel-based assets (e.g., coal resource reserves, and coal-fired power plants) would thus be at risk of becoming41
stranded assets. As massive stranding of fossil resources and carbon-intensive capital assets translates into42
huge losses of wealth and jobs. Resource-rich economies such as OPEC, China, Australia, and Russia might43
have strong incentives to rescue the potential stranded dirty assets and pursue energy transition without44
the stranding of dirty assets. In other words, when policymakers choose the conventional way of transition45
that uses clean energy to replace dirty one, it is the case where energy transition is at risk of asset stranding46
and wealth losses. In contrast, if policymakers pay attention to avoiding capital stranding, the mechanism47
presented in this paper might be a potential way to achieve energy transition without asset stranding.48
A future energy landscape with the coexistence of both fossil dirty and renewable clean capital may49
arise from concerns with the security of energy supplies, diversification, intermittency of renewables, and50
path dependence in the energy market (van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012b; Fouquet, 2016). Furthermore,51
when we extend the scope of clean capital to include facilities such as climate geoengineering and carbon52
capture and storage (CSS), the clean capital is expected to decarbonize dirty capital, and the latter53
will no longer be constrained by environmental regulations and thereby keep on growing with clean54
capital.(e.g., Moreno-Cruz, 2013, 2015; Moreno-Cruz and Smulders, 2017; Moreno-Cruz et al., 2017;55
Heutel et al., 2016, 2018).1 By doing so, stranding of the fossil-based dirty capital can be avoided, and the56
economic values of dirty capital could be protected, which matters for preserving wealth and protecting57
employment in resource-rich economies.58
In this context, we are motivated to rationalize the above-mentioned stylized fact: energy transition59
can accommodate an outcome where both fossil-based dirty and renewable-based clean energy capital60
coexist - a claim that is consistent with the long-run energy trends and projections (e.g., BP, 2019; IEA,61
2019). In this paper, we analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the interaction between dirty and clean62
capital under environmental constraints. As the focus of our investigations is on the effect of clean capital63
on avoiding the stranding of dirty capital, the Uzawa-Lucas growth model is arguably a methodologically64
appealing framework that facilitates an analysis of the interaction between dirty and clean capital under65
environmental constraints. The classical Uzawa-Lucas growth model focuses on the interaction between66
1In a more radical case, the development of negative emission technologies, such as bioenergy with CCS, could contribute
to the removal of carbon pollutants from the atmosphere, thus making more room for the continual deployment of dirty
assets (e.g., National Research Council, 2015a,b; Bui et al., 2018).
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human and physical capital for endogenous economic growth. We adapt the Uzawa-Lucas growth model67
into the green growth context and thus develop a green growth model. Based on this modified model,68
we specifically investigate how dirty and clean capital can interact and affect the energy transition.69
We show that a shock that tightens pollution regulations will lead to downward adjustments of70
capital stocks, investment, capital values, and outputs. However, when the transition includes dynam-71
ically accumulating clean capital to induce green structural change, the transition path will move to an72
equilibrium where both dirty and clean capital can coexist and grow simultaneously. Both dirty and clean73
capital can interact and benefit each other. On the one hand, clean capital offsets pollution damages,74
protects dirty capital values, and avoids stranding of dirty capital. On the other hand, the dirty capital,75
without stranding, facilitates the production of outputs that provide economic resources for clean capital76
investment. Hence, interactions between dirty and clean capital generate complementarity that prompts77
the simultaneous accumulation of both capital stocks.78
In the above-mentioned case, green structural change via stepping-up of clean capital accumulation79
could generate a path of transition along which both dirty and clean capital can coexist and grow simulta-80
neously. While this pattern of transition can generate a stronger growth momentum as compared to the81
case without green structural change (i.e., the transition is only driven by dirty capital accumulation), the82
transition path still cannot sustain growth and will end up with a steady-state equilibrium in the long run.83
The reasons are that correcting for the effect of convex pollution damages needs to allocate an increasing84
amount of resources towards clean capital, thus crowding out the resources available for consumption85
and investment. Meanwhile, the adjustment costs that exist in the clean capital investment shrink the86
resources available for investment. Accordingly, the pattern of transition cannot attain endogenous growth.87
We thus consider another model variant in which the transition can achieve endogenous growth88
without converging to a steady state. We show that the endogenous growth can be attainable with89
sustained growth of consumption and capital stocks when the following two conditions are met: 1) the90
preference has a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and environmental goods, and91
2) investment goods allocated towards clean capital are fully installed without adjustment costs. The92
implications of these two conditions for endogenous growth are as follows. The first condition implies that93
pollution damages need to be concave with bounded marginal damages. Otherwise, an overwhelming94
amount of economic resources needs to be allocated towards pollution abatement, thus crowding out95
the amount of resources allocated towards investment and consumption. This condition suggests that96
it’s crucial to break the link between pollution and environmental damages by taking mitigation and97
adaptation measures. The second condition implies that it’s also important to improve the efficiency of98
creating clean capital assets. The more efficient the conversion of investment goods into clean capital stocks,99
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the more likely the transition can harness green structural change through clean capital accumulation to100
achieve endogenous growth. Alternatively, if investing in clean capital is subject to substantial adjustment101
costs (i.e., the efficiency of clean capital accumulation is low), then economic resources allocated towards102
clean capital for green structural change are shrinking over time, thus losing the momentum to sustain103
endogenous growth of consumption and capital investment during the transition process.104
Related Literature. Our work is closely related to the literature of growth and the environment105
which finds its origin in Grossman and Krueger (1995). The existing studies explore the mechanism106
for green growth transitions through the following three channels. First, a strand of literature focuses107
on pollution abatement and control. A fraction of production outputs is allocated towards spending on108
pollution abatements that eliminates the negative effects of pollution emissions arising from production109
or consumption. (e.g., Andreoui and Levinson, 2001; Hartman and Kwon, 2005; Bartz and Kelly, 2008;110
Brock and Taylor, 2010).111
Second, a growing body of literature uses the theory of endogenous technical change to address growth112
and the environment (e.g., van Zon and Yetkiner, 2003; di Maria and Valente, 2008; Rubio et al., 2009;113
Peretto, 2009; Bretschger and Smulders, 2012; Jin and Zhang, 2016; Bretschger et al., 2017). In particular,114
Smulders and de Nooij (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) present directed technical change models that115
endogenize the rate and direction of pollution-augmenting technological change. The focus of this strand116
of works is on allocating resources towards innovation to create new varieties or improve the qualities117
of intermediate inputs that enhance productivity/efficiency of natural resources/pollution emissions.118
Third, our work also connects with the works emphasizing substitutions between dirty and clean119
energy and regime switches from carbon-based exhaustible energy to carbon-free renewable backstops (e.g.,120
Tsur and Zemel, 2005; Chakravorty et al., 2006, 2008; Smulders et al., 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen,121
2012a, 2014). As this strand of the literature concludes transition from fossil-based dirty to renewable-based122
clean energy regimes, it reflects the natural progression of economic development and structural change123
from dirty industrial to clean service economies (e.g., Kongsamut et al., 2001; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007).124
As a departure from the existing literature, this paper focuses on the channel of clean capital accumulation125
for green growth transitions. We consider dirty and clean inputs as accumulative capital stocks, and126
both dirty and clean capital can interact and generate intertemporal trade-offs. In this regard, our model127
builds on the Lucas-Uzawa two-sector endogenous growth with physical and human capital (e.g., Uzawa,128
1965; Lucas, 1988; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Hartman and Kwon, 2005; Ruiz-Tamarit, 2008).129
Layout. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidences. Section130
3 presents the model. Section 4 gives the results of the analysis and numerical simulations. Section 5131
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics of Clean and Dirty Capital in China and EU
Region Capital Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
China
clean capital 121.37 145.78 6.24 590.67
dirty capital 306.77 310.38 17.53 1060.94
E.U.
clean capital 393.72 90.31 290.28 555.88
dirty capital 452.66 31.71 401.34 497.39
Note: Capital is measured by installed capacity of electricity generation in gigawatts.
concludes.132
2 Empirical Evidences133
To show that clean capital investment as induced by environmental regulations does not necessarily lead134
to the stranding of dirty capital, this section provides empirical tests of both the short- and long-run135
correlation between clean and dirty capital.136
Data Sources. As the major sources of atmospheric pollutants are fossil energy combustion for137
electricity generation, we use the data from the power generation sector for our empirical investigations.138
Specifically, we measure the stock of dirty capital by the installed capacity of power generation using fossil139
energy such as coal, oil, and natural gas, while the stock of clean capital by the installed capacity of power140
generation using low-carbon energy such as solar, wind, hydropower, and nuclear, etc. Furthermore, we test141
these relationships in two different types of economies: China as a developing country, and the European142
Union (EU) as a developed economy. China’s installed capacity of power generation is obtained from143
Statistics of China Electric Power Industry 2017 (China Electric Power Press, 2017b) and China Electric144
Power Yearbook 2017 (China Electric Power Press, 2017a).2 The data for EU is provided by Eurostat145
Regional Yearbook 2019 (European Commission, 2019).3 Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics146
of clean and dirty capital (measured by install capacity of electricity generation) in China and the EU.147
Unit-root Test. As the first step of our empirical analysis, we employ the Augmented Dicky-Fuller148
(ADF) unit-root test to show the stationary of each variable and to determine the selection of models.149
2The installed generation capacity data for China is obtained from Statistics of China Electric Power Industry 2017
(China Electric Power Press, 2017b). It covers data on fossil-fired power plants and hydroelectric power plants from 1970 to
2016. We then extend the data by including the installed capacity of nuclear and renewable energies such as wind, solar, and
biomass power plants, which are obtained from China Electric Power Yearbook 2017 (China Electric Power Press, 2017a).
3Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2019 includes the total installed capacity of all 28 EU member states, differentiated by
technologies including combustible fuels, hydro, geothermal, wind, solar, tide, wave, ocean, and nuclear, for 2000-2017.
The dirty capital is measured by the capacity of combustible fuels, and the clean capital is a sum of all the renewable
capacity and nuclear (European Commission, 2019).
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The test results are reported for two cases: one with an intercept, and the other with both intercept150
and trend. Table II shows that the unit root problem exists at both level and first-difference among151
all variables. As the empirical time-series models require stationary assumptions, we cannot use the152
level variables for our analysis. The problem is eliminated by further differencing. Specifically, the first153
difference of capital stock is an approximation of the growth rate of capital, and the first difference in the154
growth rate corresponds to changes in the growth rate. Therefore, the level variables are I(2), and the155
growth rate variables are I(1). In the following, our empirical tests are based on the growth rate variables.156
Table II: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit-root Tests
Variables Intercept only Intercept & trend Optimal lag
Panel I: level
China
LnClean 3.860 -0.100 1
LnDirty -0.674 -3.079 3
EU
LnClean -0.270 -3.096 2
LnClean -2.310 -0.999 3















Panel III: first-difference of the growth rate
China
∆grClean -4.576*** -4.483*** 4
∆grDirty -5.040*** -5.061*** 0
EU
∆grClean -4.339*** -4.313*** 0
∆grDirty -5.470*** -5.491*** 0
Note: “Ln” indicates the natural log operator, “gr” the growth rate, and ∆ the first difference
operator. Significant levels are denoted as * of 10%, ** of 5%, *** of 1%. Optimal lag orders are
determined based on Akaike information criteria (AIC).
Long-run Relationship Test. We test the long-run relationship between dirty and clean capital by
using the method of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models as proposed by Pesaran and Shin
(1999).4 This provides an approach to model the relationship between variables in a single-equation
time-series setup, and it is also capable of dealing with nonstationary variables via a re-parameterization
in an error-correction (EC) form (Engle and Granger, 1987; Hassler and Wolters, 2006). The existence of
4In the time series literature, the traditional approach to examine correlations is bivariate cointegration test (Engle
and Granger, 1987) or multivariate cointegration analysis (Johansen, 1988, 1991). However, there are some drawbacks:
the order of integration of the variables needs to be determined. It uses OLS in the first step to estimate the static levels
model, which can create bias in finite samples due to the omitted short-run dynamics Banerjee et al. (1986). Such bias
further transmits to poor estimates in the second step.
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a long-run relationship can thus be tested based on the EC representation. A bounds testing procedure
is available to draw inference without knowing whether the order of integration of the variables (Pesaran

























where “∆” is the first difference operator, “gr” the growth rate of a given variable, and the error term, et,157
is assumed to follow i.i.d.. λj j=1,2 is the long-run coefficient, and there is no long-run or cointegration158
relationship between clean and dirty capital if λj=0. βi and γi are the short-run coefficients. p and q159
are the number of lags in the short-run equations. The superscript symbol “′” represents all respective160
estimated parameters for model with alternative dependent variable. The optimal lag structure of161
our model is selected by Akaike information criteria (AIC), as it performs better with small samples162
(Lütkepohl, 2005). From empirical results of the ARDL-EC model given in Table III, we do not find163
long-run correlations between dirty and clean capital growth. However, Table III documents the result164
supporting the existence of a short-run correlation between dirty and clean capital growth: the growth165
of clean capital positively affects the growth of dirty capital in the short run.166
Graphical Assessment by Chi-plot. We offer a graphical assessment of our sample for robustness167
tests. Fisher and Switzer (1985) and Fisher and Switzer (2001) propose a graphical method to assess the168
correlation with Chi-plot. It enables to investigate the complex relationship between variables and local169
characteristics by scatter plot of respective statistics. Following Fisher and Switzer (1985), we draw the170
Chi-plot, where the values of χi (that measures the correlation between two variables) and the values of λi171
(that measures the distance of observation to the sample center) need to be calculated. Both parameters172
fall within a range between -1 and 1, and two variables are strictly monotonically increasing with each173
other when χi equals 1. Figure 2 provides the scatter plots of the growth rate of two types of capital in174
China and the EU and the respective Chi-plot. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows that China’s values are close to175
zero within the 95% confidence interval, represented by two flat dished lines. We, therefore, conclude that176
both dirty and clean capital grow independently, which is consistent with the previous results. Similarly,177
panel (b) of Figure 2 gives a similar result for the EU: most of the data points are within the two flat dished178
lines. This implies that the growth of two types of capital in the EU also has an independent relationship.179
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Table III: Empirical Test of the ARDL-EC Model
China E.U.
Dependent variable ∆grClean ∆grDirty ∆grClean ∆grDirty
Long run
L1.grClean -0.206 -0.104 -0.978 -1.199
(0.193) (0.256) (0.449) (0.572)
L1.grDirty 1.796 -0.459*** -0.521 -0.739
(2.183) (0.128) (0.381) (0.356)
Short run
LD.grClean -0.662** 0.429*** 1.179 1.456**
(0.254) (0.121) (0.723) (0.393)














constant -0.009 0.033 0.041
(0.033) (0.018)
Optimal lag for p 3 2 4 3
Optimal lag for q 0 2 4 4
ARDL Bounds test 1.913a 7.937a 2.369a 4.608a
No cointeg. Cointeg. No cointeg. No cointeg.
R-squared 0.38 0.526 0.835 0.860
Log likelihood 57.51 77.04 48.69 48.69
Breusch-Pagan test 2.16 2.27 2.12 0.10
for heteroskedasticity (0.142)b (0.132)b (0.145)b (0.145)b
Note: a F-statistic; b p-value, standard error in parenthesis. Symbol “L” indicates lag.
“D” denotes first difference. Significant levels are denoted as * of 10%, ** of 5%, *** of 1%.
Optimal lag orders p and q are determined based on Akaike information criteria (AIC).
3 The Model180
As discussed in previous sections, stranded assets are assets that have suffered from premature write-181
downs, devaluations, or conversion to liabilities. A variety of risk factors represent a discontinuity able to182
profoundly alter asset values and cause stranded assets (Caldecott and McDaniels, 2014; Caldecott et al.,183
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(a) China (b) European Union
Figure 2: Scatter plot of the growth rate of two types of capital and the Chi-plot for (a) China and (b) EU.
2014). When the pattern of the energy transition is at the cost of asset stranding, countries that are rich in184
fossil resources and capital would suffer from substantial losses in revenues, employment, and wealth linked185
to fossil fuels. Our theoretical expositions are thus motivated to explore the potential mechanism through186
which energy transition can occur without asset stranding. For that purpose, we develop a two-sector187
green growth model to analyze the interaction between dirty and clean capital. In the end, we will show188
that the general equilibrium effect of pollution regulations, efficiency improvement, and structural change189
leads to an outcome where both dirty and clean capital can coexist and grow simultaneously. Dirty capital190
can continue to grow alongside clean capital (i.e., complementarity between dirty and clean capital).191
The framework for theoretical expositions is the two-sector green growth model in the spirit of the
endogenous growth theory a la Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988). Our green growth model considers a








subject to the law of motion for dirty capital KD and clean capital KC as:
K̇D(t)=F(KD(t),KC(t))−C(t)−IC(t)−δKD(t), K̇C(t)=Φ(IC(t))−δKC(t), (2)




C. The preference of the representative household192
is additively separable over consumption C and pollution P . The utility from consumption is concave and193
satisfied the Inada condition, i.e., U ′(C)>0, U ′′(C)<0, and limC→0U
′=∞. Disutility from pollution194
is convex with the condition V ′(P)>0, V ′′(P)>0, and limP→0V
′(P)=0.195
Note that, the main feature of our model is that clean (abatement) capital is specified as an accumula-196
9
tive stock while Smulders and Gradus (1996) considers abatement as a flow variable. The long-run balanced197
growth path might not change qualitatively when extending the abatement flow into stock. But it might be198
more appealing to conceptualize clean (abatement) capital as a stock variable because equipments/facilities199
for pollution control and abatement are indeed one kind of accumulative capital that requires investment200
to augment over time (e.g., investments scale up the deployment of renewable energy facilities over time,201
and this accumulative process is the same as the capital used to produce consumption goods).5202
Both dirty and clean capital are imperfect substitute in final goods production according to the technol-203
ogy Y =F(KD,KC) with FKD>0, FKC>0. The production function is homogenous of degree one and sat-204
isfies the following assumption: the marginal product of dirty capital rises with clean capital, i.e., FKDKC≡205
∂FKD/∂KC>0. This assumption is commonly used in standard specifications of production technologies206











σ−1 , where KD and KC are imperfect substitutes and208
the marginal product of KD increases with KC. Note that, as in the green growth literature (e.g., Tahvo-209
nen and Salo, 2001; Tsur and Zemel, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Long, 2014; van der Meijden, 2014), our210
paper just imposes the assumption that KD and KC are imperfect substitutes with a certain degree of211
substitution on the production side, rather than directly assuming that KD and KC are complementary.
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212
In our model, simultaneous accumulation (complementarity) of KD and KC is an endogenous
outcome of interactions among pollution regulations, efficiency improvement, and structural change.
Specifically, we consider that pollution emissions are proportional to dirty capital, i.e., P=mKD, where
the emission intensity m is inversely related to the output Y as given by m=ψY −1, and ψ is a coefficient.
This specification is in line with efficiency improvement caused by the learning-by-doing effect: production
5We also argue that different specifications of abatement could generate different effects on consumption and welfare.
When abatement is specified as a flow, the optimal amount of economic resources allocated towards abatement will be
sufficiently large at each instantaneous time point, such that convex pollution damages can be effectively corrected. As a result,
final goods allocated towards consumption will be crowded out, thus reducing the level of consumption and utility gains. In
contrast, when abatement is specified as a stock that can be accumulated by an investment over time, the amount of final goods
allocated towards investment in clean (abatement) capital could be much smaller as compared to the case of abatement flows.
As a result, the amount of final goods allocated towards consumption would be larger, yielding a higher level of welfare gains.
6Note that, the assumption that the marginal product of KD increases with KC, i.e.,
∂FKD
∂KC
>0, does not necessarily
translate into the condition of complementarity between KD and KC, i.e.,
∂KD
∂KC
> 0, where an increase in the demand
for clean capital will cause a larger quantity of dirty capital to be demanded if KC is a gross complement to KD. Given
that the production function is homogenous of degree one, we have F(KD,KC)=KDFKD +KCFKC . Rearranging and


















where the positive sign follows from the assumption of concavity FKCKC <0. Therefore, we argue that the assumption
∂FKD
∂KC
> 0 does not necessarily lead to the condition of complementarity ∂KD
∂KC
> 0. The mechanism that generates
simultaneous accumulation (complementarity) of both KD and KC is not the assumption that the marginal product of





at a larger scale tends to generate efficiency improvements that drive a decline in the emission intensity
(e.g., Arrow, 1962; Gillingham et al., 2008).7 Then environmental regulations for internalizing pollution
damages will induce clean capital investment to restructure the economy that is originally driven by dirty
capital accumulation. With the contribution of clean capital to structural change, outputs are produced












where the second equality follows from the homogeneity of degree one, i.e., F(KD,KC)=KDF(1,KC/KD)=213
KDf(KC/KD). As equation (3) shows, the emission is homogenous of degree zero with respect to KC and214
KD, meaning that there will be no growth in emissions when both dirty and clean capital is accumulated215
at the same pace. In other words, the accumulation of clean capital can play a pivotal role to stabilize216
emission growth and offset pollution damages caused by the use of dirty capital. With the build-up217
of clean capital to eliminate the polluting effect of dirty capital, the latter will not be affected by the218
emission constraints. Both dirty and clean capital can thus grow simultaneously (complementarity).8219
The emission function P =P(KD,KC) specified in (3) thus implies that PKD > 0 and PKC < 0.220
Generally, the scope of clean capital can be extended to include any forms of environment-friendly capital221
such as human capital (that is much less polluting than physical capital deployed in pollution-intensive222
manufacturing sectors). In the field of energy economics, empirical studies such as Salim et al. (2017), Yao223
et al. (2019), and Yao et al. (2021) show that there is a significantly negative relationship between human224
capital and energy consumption or carbon emissions in the long run. These empirical results suggest225
that human capital can generate a positive effect to reduce energy use and pollution emissions. From226
this perspective, we argue that clean capital could also play an important role to reduce the polluting227
effect associated with dirty capital.228
Both dirty and clean capital are accumulative stocks and evolve according to the law of motion229
K̇D=ID−δKD and K̇C=Φ(IC)−δKC, where ID and IC are the investment in dirty and clean capital,230
respectively. δ is the rate of capital depreciation. Production outputs of final goods are allocated231
towards consumption and investment in equilibrium, and the aggregate resource constraint thus reads232
7The intensity of carbon emission m is inversely related to the output Y in line with empirical evidence that supports
a declining emission intensity.
8In the real world, this knife-edge case corresponds to a scenario where energy transition is characterized by substantial
efficiency improvement and emission intensity reduction. For example, the energy system is restructured by deploying
a massive capacity of generation powered by renewables, high-efficiency facilities, climate geoengineering, carbon capture
and storage, and negative-emission clean technologies which have already become technically feasible. The development
and deployment of clean technologies could contribute to reducing the emission intensity of dirty capital or even sucking
carbon out of the atmosphere, thus making room for the continual deployment of dirty capital (e.g., Moreno-Cruz, 2013,
2015; Moreno-Cruz and Smulders, 2017; Heutel et al., 2016, 2018).
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Y =C+IC+ID.
9 Furthermore, one unit of final goods allocation towards investment in dirty capital233
accumulates one unit of capital stocks in the dirty sector. However, allocating one unit of final goods234
towards clean capital investment leads to less than one unit of capital accumulation in the clean sector,235
because there are costs of conversion between two different types of capital (the clean capital differs from236
the dirty one). In other words, capital goods are convertible between dirty and clean types, but this is237
subject to intersectoral conversion costs as measured by the function Φ. The following properties hold:238
Φ′(.)>0, Φ′′(.)<0, Φ(0)=0, and Φ′(0)=1. That is, the more irreversible the dirty capital, the higher239
the costs associated with converting dirty into clean capital. The capital conversion costs vanish when240
there is no allocation towards clean capital investments.241
The model specified in equations (1)-(2) captures the potential interaction between dirty and clean242
capital through the following three channels. First, clean capital as an imperfect substitute can interact243
with dirty capital on the production side, and an increase in clean capital will raise the marginal product244
of dirty capital, e.g., ∂FKD/∂KC>0, (this does not necessarily translate into the complementarity as245
detailed above). Second, clean capital can fully eliminate the polluting effect of dirty capital through246
the environmental channel, i.e., the emission function is homogenous of degree zero. Third, final goods247
outputs net of consumption are allocated towards investments, and clean capital competes with dirty248
capital for investment goods, i.e., IC+ID=F(KD,KC)−C. The equilibrium allocation of investment249
between dirty and clean capital depends on Tobin’s Q (dynamic benefits) of these two capital stocks.250
As an endogenous general equilibrium outcome of the above-mentioned interaction between dirty251
and clean capital, we will show below that there is simultaneous accumulation (complementarity) of252
both dirty and clean capital. In other words, we are not intended to say there are no reverse causalities253
between dirty and clean capital. On the one hand, stepping-up of clean capital accumulation offsets254
emission growth and thus provides more room for further deployment of dirty capital. On the other hand,255
with further accumulation of dirty capital, more outputs can be produced to provide economic resources256
that facilitate clean capital accumulation. Both dirty capital and clean capital could thus coexist and257
grow simultaneously in the energy transition.258
9Rewriting the aggregate resource constraint yields ID=Y −C−ID, and substituting it into the law of motion for dirty
capital yields the first expression of (2).
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4 Results259
4.1 Characterizations of the Optimum260
The Pontryagin Maximum Principle of the optimal control is used to solve the problem of maximizing261
(1) subject to (2). The following proposition is derived to characterize the optimum.262
Proposition 1. For the green growth problem that maximizes (1) subject to (2), the optimal allocations








and transversality conditions: limt→+∞e
−ρtλDKD=0 and limt→+∞e
−ρtλCKC=0, where λD and λC are263
the shadow values associated with dirty and clean capital, respectively.264
Following the characterizations of the optimum given in (4), we derive the following set of differential





where consumption C(λD) and clear capital investment IC(λC,λD) are optimally determined by λC and265
λD according to the first two expressions of equation (4). Equations (5a)-(5b) describe the law of motion266
for capital stocks and their shadow values, respectively.267
Given the initial stocks of capital [KD(0),KC(0)], there is a stable saddle path that endogenously268
determines the initial shadow values [λD(0),λC(0)]. Then starting from the initial condition, the economy269
evolves along the stable saddle path and converges to the long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, the first-best270
optimal allocations can be implemented in a decentralized market equilibrium by pricing emissions at271
a level that is equal to marginal pollution damages divided by marginal utility of consumption, i.e.,272
τ=V ′(P)/U ′(C) (Appendix A provides the details).273
4.2 Simultaneous Investment in Dirty and Clean Capital274
This subsection shows that the optimal path of energy transition can be characterized by simultaneous275
investment in both dirty and clean capital. First, for the existence of investment in dirty capital, the Inada276
condition implies that dirty capital always has dynamic benefits as measured by a positive shadow value,277
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i.e., U ′(C)=λD. Meanwhile, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation characterizing the optimal path of278
the shadow value is given by (ρ+δ)λD−λ̇D=U ′FKD−V ′PKD , where the right-hand side denotes instanta-279
neous benefits of holding dirty capital that should be positive along the optimal path at each instantaneous280
time point. We thus have λD(t)>λD(t
′) for t<t′, i.e., investment in dirty capital creates a larger shadow281
value (dynamic benefits) at an earlier date over the time horizon. As a result, it is optimal to allocate282
a positive amount of investment to augment dirty capital stock over time, i.e., KD(t)<KD(t
′) for t<t′.283
Second, for the existence of investment in clean capital, the second condition of optimality in equation284
(4), i.e., Φ′(IC) =
λD
λC
, characterizes the optimal amount of investment in clean capital. This can be285
generalized as a complementarity slackness condition: λCΦ
′(IC)≤λD, IC ≥0, (λCΦ′(IC)−λD)IC =0.286
That is, if marginal dynamic benefits (as measured by the shadow values) associated with clean capital287
investments are strictly less than those of dirty ones, i.e., Φ′(IC)λC<λD, it is efficient to allocate all288
final goods net of consumption towards dirty capital investment and there is thus no investment in clean289
capital, i.e., IC=0. But this case will not happen because stopping clean capital investment is inefficient290
for the energy transition (see Appendix B for details). In other words, as long as it is inefficient not to291
accumulate clean capital, it is the case that clean capital investment is needed on top of the existing292
investment in dirty capital. The efficient growth path satisfies equalization of marginal dynamic benefits293
between dirty and clean capital (e.g., the non-arbitrage condition). As a result, the optimal path of the294
energy transition is characterized by the simultaneous accumulation of both dirty and clean capital.295
Proposition 2. For the problem maximizing (1) subject to (2), it is efficient to allocate a positive amount296
of investment towards both dirty and clean capital, i.e., IC(t)>0, ∀t∈ [0,∞). The optimal path of the297
energy transition is thus driven by the simultaneous accumulation of capital in both dirty and clean sectors.298
Proof. See Appendix B.299
The intuitions of Proposition 2 are as follows. The equilibrium amount of investment in clean capital
















where Φ′ −1 is the inverse function (denoted by “−1”) of the derivative (denoted by “′”) of the cost function300
of clean capital conversion Φ. When the investment goods are allocated towards dirty capital accumulation,301
marginal benefits through the production channel, U ′FKD , decrease with KD. Marginal costs in terms of302
10Integrating the last two expressions of (4) yields the analytical expression of the shadow value of both dirty and clean
capital.
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pollution damages, V ′PKD , increase with KD. In contrast, for clean capital investments, marginal benefits303
through the production channel, U ′FKC , decrease with KC. Marginal costs through the environmental304
channel, V ′PKC , also decrease with KC. Therefore, intertemporal benefits gained by clean capital invest-305
ments could be larger than dirty ones. It is thus efficient to allocate investment goods towards clean capital.306
4.3 Transitional Dynamics307
Table IV: Specifications of functional forms
Function Specification
utility U(C)=C1−η/(1−η)
















clean capital investment Φ(IC)=IC−0.5φI2C
Table V: Parameters for simulations
Description Parameter Value
coefficient of relative risk aversion η 0.5
coefficient of marginal pollution damage κ 0.4
share parameter α 0.5
elasticity of substitution σ 1.5
coefficient of efficiency improvement ψ 0.32
capital productivity A 0.25
coefficient of capital conversion costs φ 0.5
rate of time preference ρ 0.06
rate of capital depreciation δ 0.05
We numerically solve the model to simulate the trajectory of transitional dynamics. The specific
functional forms and parameters for model simulations are given in Table IV-V. The utility function is
CRRA, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at η=0.5 within the consensus range 0.4-1 (e.g.,
15
Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Epstein and Zin, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2012). The rate of time preference is
given by ρ=0.06 which is within the standard range. The pollution damages are convex as specified as a
quadratic function, where the coefficient of marginal pollution damages is set at κ=0.4. The production
function is specified as CES technology, where the parameter of capital productivity is set at A=0.25,
and the input share parameter is α=0.5. According to the empirical estimates of Papageorgiou et al.
(2017), the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy inputs is significantly greater than
unity - around 2 for the electricity-generating sector and close to 3 for nonenergy industries. Hence, the
benchmark value of the elasticity of substitution is set at σ=1.5. We also consider a lower degree of
substitution at σ=0.5 and a higher degree of substitution at σ=2.5, which allows us to investigate the
robust trend of energy transition under different degrees of substitution. The learning-by-doing effect
drives a decline in emission intensity and gives an emission function with homogenous of degree zero.
The coefficient governing the emission intensity decline is given by ψ=0.32. Converting final goods into
capital goods in clean sectors is subject to capital conversion costs, and the coefficient of conversion costs
is set at φ=0.5. Given these function specifications, transitional dynamics are characterized by the law


























σ . Solving the308
system of differential equations yields four eigenvalues with two positive and two negative, suggesting309
that the transitional dynamics are saddle-path stable.310
Figure 3(a) plots the phase diagram of transitional dynamics driven by simultaneous investment311
in both dirty and clean capital. Both dirty and clean capital evolve along their corresponding stable312
saddle paths and converge towards their steady-state equilibria. Figure 3(b) shows the time paths of313
shadow values, where the dashed red line representing the shadow value of clean capital lies above the314
solid blue one denoting the shadow value of dirty capital over the phase of transitional dynamics. This315
result suggests that investing in clean capital can create larger dynamic benefits as compared to dirty316
ones along the efficient path of transition. Since clean capital can protect economic values of dirty capital317
by mitigating the social cost of pollution damages incurred by dirty capital, it is efficient to accumulate318
clean capital besides the existing dirty capital. This is demonstrated in Figure 3(c), where the amount319
of investment in both dirty and clean capital increases over time. As a result, the stock of dirty capital320
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Figure 3: Simulation paths of transition driven by simultaneous investment in both dirty and clean capital.
Panel (a) plots the phase diagram of transitional dynamics. Panel (b) plots the time path of shadow
prices. Panel (c) plots the time path of capital investment. Panel (d) plots the time path of capital stocks.
is augmented alongside clean capital accumulation, rather than falls precipitously in the face of the321
potential substitution by clean capital, as shown in Figure 3(d). This result rationalizes our argument322
that energy transition might accommodate a case where both dirty and clean capital can coexist and grow323
simultaneously. Energy transition might not necessarily lead to stranding of the existing dirty capital.324
Figure 4 shows how both environmental regulation stringency and green structural change via clean325
capital accumulation affect the path of transition. Specifically, in a benchmark case excluding green326
structural change, there is no investment to dynamically accumulate clean capital, and the pattern of327
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Figure 4: Comparison between the benchmark transition and transition after the shocks. (a) dirty
capital stocks; (b) dirty capital investments; (c) dirty capital values; (d) production outputs. The solid
blue line corresponds to the benchmark path of transition without both pollution regulation shocks
and green structural change (excludes dynamic accumulation of clean capital). The dashed red line
shows the path of transition after the shock to environmental stringency and green structural change.
Green structural change refers to the stepping-up of clean capital accumulation. The marker of the
blue circle denotes the time at which the shock to pollution regulation stringency leads to downward
adjustments of capital. The marker of red circle denotes the time at which transition includes green
structural change via stepping-up of clean capital accumulation.
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transition will only be driven by the accumulation of dirty capital. As Figure 4 shows, without a shock328
to environmental stringency to internalize pollution damages (i.e., the coefficient of marginal pollution329
damages is set to null κ=0), capital stocks, investment, capital values, and production outputs evolve330
along the solid blue line in this benchmark case and converge to the steady state in the long run.331
In contrast, when there is a shock that tightens environmental regulations (implemented as an332
increase in the coefficient of marginal pollution damages from κ=0 to κ=0.4), the path of transition as333
shown by the red dashed line will differ substantially. Specifically, at the time of a shock to environmental334
stringency (marked by the blue circle), the tightening of pollution regulations leads to a phase where335
capital stocks, investment, capital values, and outputs all have seen large downward adjustments. However,336
when the transition includes dynamically accumulating clean capital for green structural change at the337
time marked by the red circle, this change will move the transition upwards to an equilibrium path338
with continual growth. Along this transition path, dirty capital stocks, investments, capital values, and339
production outputs will all end up with higher levels as compared to those in the benchmark case.340
Accordingly, with the stepping-up of clean capital accumulation for green structural change, the341
transition can potentially accommodate the continual growth of dirty capital, not necessarily leading342
to dirty capital stranding. Both dirty and clean capital can coexist and grow simultaneously during the343
transition. On the one hand, clean capital, by eliminating the polluting effect of dirty capital, protects344
the economic values of dirty capital and thus rescue stranded dirty assets. On the other hand, dirty345
capital, without stranding, enables production at a larger scale, which in turn provides more economic346
resources to facilitate clean capital investment.347
We also simulate the path of the energy transition with various degrees of substitution between dirty348
and clean capital. As Figure 5, the trend of simultaneous accumulation (complementarity) of both dirty349
and clean capital are still robust with various degrees of substitution between dirty and clean capital.350
In the case of a higher degree of substitutability (the elasticity of substitution σ=2.5), clean capital as351
induced by the tightening of pollution regulations will substitute out dirty capital. But the production352
input of dirty capital is still necessary for final good production. This is because marginal benefits of353
consumption should be equal to the shadow value of dirty capital, and the Inada condition requires that354
the dirty capital needs to create a positive shadow value. Dirty capital investments are always needed355
to deliver benefits through the production channel to offset pollution damages, such that the positive356
shadow value can be generated by dirty capital investment. As a result, along the efficient path of the357
energy transition, dirty capital will continue to augment alongside clean capital when the latter is induced358
to augment in the presence of stringent climate regulations. Meanwhile, in the case of a lower degree of359
substitutability (the elasticity of substitution σ=0.5), dirty capital investment drives output growth, but360
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Figure 5: The optimal path of energy transition under different degree of substitution: (a) capital
investment; (b) capital stock. The red and blue lines denote clean and dirty capital, respectively. The
solid, dashed, dotted lines correspond to the lower degree of substitution σ=0.5, the benchmark degree
of substitution σ=1.5, and the higher degree of substitution σ=2.5, respectively.
this will also lead to emissions and pollution damages. It is efficient to launch clean capital investment361
to eliminate the polluting effect of dirty capital and correct for convex pollution damages. As a result,362
both dirty and clean capital is needed in the efficient path of the energy transition.363
4.4 Balanced Growth Mechanism364
The previous section shows that the interaction among pollution regulations, efficiency improvement, and365
structural change could generate an effect that leads to simultaneous accumulation (complementarity)366
of both dirty and clean capital. But this trend of transition is not sustained and will end up with a367
steady-state in the long run. In this section, we proceed by considering a mechanism of balanced growth368
through which consumption and capital accumulation can be sustained in the long run.369
For simplicity, the balanced growth path (BGP) is considered as a path along which consumption
C, dirty capital KD, and clean capital KC grow at the same rate. The ratio between consumption, dirty
















where g is the rate of balanced growth, c the consumption-dirty capital ratio, and k the dirty-clean
capital ratio. Given that the production technology is homogenous of degree (HoD) one and the emission
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Then the optimal path of transition characterized by (4) can yield balanced growth through the following370
mechanism.371











and investment goods allocated towards clean capital can be fully installed as clean capital stocks without
conversion costs, i.e.,
K̇C=Φ(IC)=IC−δKC, (11)










where ρ is the rate of time preference, and δ the rate of capital depreciation. The triple [g,c,k] is defined372
by (7). f(k), g(k), f ′(k) and g′(k) are given by (8)-(9).373
Proof. See Appendix C.374
For the characterizations of the BGP, (12a)-(12c) provide the intensive-form expression of the Euler375
consumption rule, the law of motion for capital stocks, and the non-arbitrage condition between dirty376
and clean capital investment, respectively. For the conditions that ensure the BGP, equation (10) implies377
that pollution damages need to be concave with bounded marginal damages. Otherwise, an increasing378
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amount of final goods needs to be allocated towards clean capital investment, thus crowding out resources379
available for investment and consumption. Meanwhile, equation (11) suggests that investment goods380
allocated towards clean capital should be fully converted into capital stocks in the clean sector without381
conversion costs. If converting investment goods into clean capital is subject to conversion costs, then the382
resources available for investment will shrink over time, thus losing the momentum of sustained growth.383
Using the functional specification and parameter values given in Table IV-V, we solve (12a)-(12c)


























When the conditions (10)-(11) are met, there is a BGP alone which consumption, dirty capital, and clean384
capital grow at a rate of 7.1%. Meanwhile, the BGP is characterized by a ratio between consumption,385
dirty and clean capital: c :=C/KD=0.626 and k :=KD/KC=0.106.386
5 Conclusion387
Tightening of environmental regulations induces demand shifts towards carbon-free renewables that388
replace carbon-intensive fossil fuels. Carbon-intensive capital linked with fossil fuels would thus be at389
risk of becoming stranded assets and suffer from premature write-down and devaluations. This paper390
contributes to a mechanism through which fossil fuel-rich countries can rescue the stranded assets and391
protect wealth and employment linked to fossil fuel resources.392
Our empirical analysis tests the relationship between dirty and clean capital based on the data393
of the power generation sector in China from 1970 to 2016 and in EU member countries from 2000 to394
2017. The empirical results show that the growth of clean capital can positively affect the growth of dirty395
capital in the short run, and both types of capital can grow independently in the long run. To rationalize396
the empirical evidence, we investigate a potential mechanism through which both dirty and clean capital397
can coexist and grow simultaneously. More specifically, stepping-up of clean capital accumulation induced398
by stringent environmental regulations offsets the polluting effect of dirty capital, and thus provides399
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more room for further deployment of dirty capital. With the further accumulation of dirty capital, more400
outputs can be produced to provide economic resources for clean capital accumulation. As a result, the401
energy transition can potentially accommodate the simultaneous accumulation of both dirty and clean402
capital, not necessarily leading to the stranding of dirty capital. Furthermore, when the preference has403
a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and pollution and there is no adjustment cost404
in clean capital accumulation, the pattern of energy transition can fall into a balanced growth path along405
which consumption, dirty capital, and clean capital can grow sustainedly in the long run.406
There are still important caveats. First, in our two-sector growth model, specifications of the law407
of motion for capital focus on the channel of intrasectoral capital investment. One important direction408
of extension is to incorporate intersectoral capital reallocation into the dynamic process of capital409
accumulation. This extension can give new insights into the potential effect of capital malleability on asset410
stranding (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2020; Hambel et al., 2020). For example, if capital is malleable with smaller411
intersectoral reallocation costs, capital deployed in the dirty sector (coal-fired power plants) could be412
reallocated and deployed in the clean sector (PV facility or windmills), thus avoiding the stranding of dirty413
capital in the energy transition. Second, in the context of climate mitigation, pollution damages are closely414
related to temperature increases caused by cumulative emissions (e.g., Dietz and Venmans, 2019; van den415
Bijgaart et al., 2016; van der Ploeg et al., 2020). It is thus important to extend the analytical framework by416
explicitly considering the connection between cumulative emissions, temperature rise, and the damaging417
effects of warming on the economy. We leave detailed expositions of these areas for future research.418
Appendix A Implementing the Optimum in a Market Equilibrium419
In the market equilibrium, the problem of the representative household is to maximize
∫∞
0 exp(−ρt)U(C)dt420
subject to K̇D=π+rDKD−C−IC, and K̇C=Φ(IC)+rCKC. The representative household owns dirty421
and clean capital stock KD and KC and receives remunerations by renting capital at the rate of return422
given by rD and rC, respectively. The household also has an ownership of a representative firm using423
dirty and clean capital to produce final goods and receives profits π. Solving the household problem424
yields characterizations: U ′(C) = λD for consumption, λD = Φ
′(IC)λC for clean capital investment,425
ρλD−λ̇D=rDλD for dirty capital stock, and ρλC−λ̇C=rCλC for clean capital stock.426
Meanwhile, a representative firm uses clean and dirty capital to produce final goods and faces a427
profit maximization problem: π(t)=F(KD,KC)−rDKD− rCΦ′(IC)KC−τP(KD,KC), where instantaneous428
profits π are obtained by subtracting the costs of renting dirty and clean capital owned by the household.429
The rate of return is rD for dirty capital, and the rate of return of clean capital rC in unit of clean capital is430
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+ τPKC for dirty and clean capital, respectively. Combining characterizations of432
both household and firm problems, the equilibrium is characterized by: U ′(C) =λD, λD = Φ
′(IC)λC,433
ρλD−λ̇D=(FKD−τPKD)λD=λDFKD−τλDPKD , and ρλC−λ̇C =(FKC−τPKC)Φ′(IC)λC =λDFKC−434
τλDPKC . It is easy to verify that by setting τ =
V ′(P)
U′(C) , the equilibrium allocations are characterized435
by U ′(C)=λD, λD =Φ
′(IC)λC, ρλD−λ̇D =(FKD−τPKD)λD =λDFKD−V ′(P)PKD , and ρλC−λ̇C =436
(FKC−τPKC)Φ′(IC)λC=λDFKC−V ′(P)PKC , which is the same as the social optimum allocations.437
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 2438
We will prove that there always exists a time point at which clean capital investment should be launched
in the optimal growth path. This is equivalent to verifying that it is impossible not to launch clean
capital investment over the entire time frame. This argument can be proved by contradiction. Suppose
there is no investment in clear capital over the entire time frame, i.e., λD(t)−Φ′(IC(t))λC(t)>0, with








where Φ′(IC(t)) = Φ
′(0) = 1 with IC(t) = 0 for ∀t∈ [0,∞). To find the contradiction, we consider the










Here U ′ is bounded due to the concavity of utility. FKD(t
∗)−FKC(t∗)<FKD(0)−FKC(0) holds because439
FKD−FKC decreases in KD and KD increases over time. Meanwhile, pollution damages are convex, and440
the marginal pollution damages V ′ are thus sufficiently large. PKD>PKC due to PKD>0 and PKC<0.441
Therefore, the sign of (B.2) is negative which contradicts with the positive sign.442
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 3443
We impose the condition of homogeneity as follows: F(ψKD,ψKC)=ψF(KD,KC), and P(ψKD,ψKC)=
P(KD,KC) ∀ψ∈R+, where the production function is homogenous of degree (HoD) one, and the emission























































where c := CK , k :=
KD
KC




,1). Second, from the law of motion for KC







where f(k):=F(KDKC ,1). Finally, equalization of instantaneous marginal benefits between dirty and clean



















Using the Euler’s theorem yields FKDKD+FKCKC=F(KD,KC). Furthermore, given that P(KD,KC)
is HoD 0, the Euler’s theorem yields PKDKD+PKCKC=0 and PKC =
−PKDKD
KC
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